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Ratification, Reporting, and Rights:  
Quality of Participation in the 
Convention against Torture
Cosette D. Creamer* & Beth A. Simmons**
AbSTRACT
The core international human rights treaty bodies play an important role in 
monitoring implementation of human rights standards through consideration 
of states parties’ reports. Yet very little research explores how seriously 
governments take their reporting obligations. This article examines the 
reporting record of parties to the Convention against Torture, finding that 
report submission is heavily conditioned by the practices of neighboring 
countries and by a government’s human rights commitment and institu-
tional capacity. This article also introduces original data on the quality and 
responsiveness of reports, finding that more democratic—and particularly 
newly democratic—governments tend to render higher quality reports.
I. INTRodUCTIoN
The ratification of international human rights treaties provokes commentary 
and analysis by policymakers, lawyers, advocates, and academics alike. Some 
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view ratification as cheap talk on the part of states, while others see it as a 
serious commitment that pledges a country’s reputation. A fair amount of 
literature on human rights treaties assumes that ratification matters in some 
way: it begins a process of socialization of elites, stimulates public mobiliza-
tion, provides ammunition for litigation, and in some cases sends a costly 
signal of a government’s intention to refrain from human rights violations. 
Treaty ratification also initiates a communicative process that connects a 
polity with the international human rights regime at various points in time. 
This “constructive dialogue” centers around state reports on implementation 
submitted to the treaty monitoring body. Not only is reporting a legal obli-
gation within all human rights conventions,1 it is also the primary method 
to generate information and increase transparency about implementation of 
and compliance with the treaty. 
Reporting and monitoring have become increasingly common aspects 
of international governance across issue areas,2 yet there is surprisingly 
little analysis of the politics of such information provision or its effects on 
state behavior. Claims about the importance of information and monitoring 
in facilitating cooperation and compliance with international agreements 
vary. In the context of human rights treaties, some claim that the reporting 
system—and information about compliance in particular—is the regime’s 
primary tool to ensure that states fulfill their obligations. Others disparage the 
entire process as a bureaucratic exercise with little to no substantive effect 
on compliance and assert that state reporting to treaty bodies is shamefully 
inadequate. Despite almost three decades of experience with the international 
human rights reporting regime, we lack a comprehensive understanding of 
  1. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The United Nations 
Human Rights Treaty System: An Introduction to the Core Human Rights Treaties and 
Treaty Bodies, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet30en.
pdf.
  2. See Daniel Bodansky, The Role of Reporting in International Environmental Treaties: Les-
sons for Human Rights Supervision, in The FuTure oF uN humaN righTs TreaTy moNiToriNg 
361, 362 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000); Thomas Conzelmann, Beyond the 
Carrot and the Stick: State Reporting Procedures in the World Trade Organization and 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, in iNTerNaTioNal orgaNiza-
TioNs aNd implemeNTaTioN: eNForcers, maNagers auThoriTies? 35 (Jutta Joachim, Bob Reinalda 
& Bertjan Verbeek Routledge eds., 2008); ryaN goodmaN & derek JiNks, socializiNg sTaTes: 
promoTiNg humaN righTs Through iNTerNaTioNal law (2013); Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources 
of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 iNT’l sTud. Q. 109 
(1998); michael o’FlaherTy, humaN righTs aNd The uN: pracTice beFore The TreaTy bodies (1996); 
Theodore J. piccoNe, caTalysTs For chaNge: how The uN’s iNdepeNdeNT experTs promoTe humaN 
righTs (2012). The International Labor Organization has one of the most robust records 
of self-reporting, presumably due to its stronger procedure for supervision. International 
Labour Organisation, Constitution of the International Labour Organisation and Standing 
Orders of the International Labour Conference, art. 22 (1989). See also Abram Chayes, 
Antonia Handler Chayes and Ronald B. Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A Comparative 
Perspective, in eNgagiNg couNTries: sTreNgTheNiNg compliaNce wiTh iNTerNaTioNal eNviroNmeNTal 
accords 39 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold Jacobson eds., 1998).
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this process and to our knowledge there have been few systematic attempts 
to evaluate these claims. Very little research explores just how seriously (if 
at all) governments take this reporting obligation or the potential influence 
of the periodic review process on states’ actual human rights practices.3 
This article examines the record of state reporting to one treaty monitor-
ing body: the Committee Against Torture (CmAT). While states do provide 
some information to treaty bodies about their implementation of human 
rights agreements, the regularity and the quality of these reports varies 
tremendously. This article seeks to explain these patterns in the context of 
the reporting regime for the Convention Against Torture (CAT), a regime 
that governs politically-sensitive rights for which it is particularly difficult to 
hold governments accountable via self-reporting.4 In fact, the CAT’s report-
ing record is the lowest among the specialized human rights treaties (the 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child).5 Government practices falling under the CAT’s 
jurisdiction are intimately linked with a country’s internal security or stability. 
In addition, the CAT covers a number of politically sensitive areas typically 
considered to be at the heart of state sovereignty, such as the administration 
of prisons, the organization and the management of police and paramilitary 
forces, the criminal justice system, and the granting of asylum. In all these 
areas of governance, states’ parties have greater incentives to obscure or 
render less than transparent information regarding their practices. Why then 
do some states comply with their reporting obligations while others do not? 
And most importantly, how and why does the quality of reporting vary so 
much across states?
Reporting quality has not been investigated systematically to date. Yet it 
is revelatory: if governments deny or refuse to identify implementation defi-
ciencies, the posited benefits of the reporting process may be elusive. For this 
reason, this article introduces original data on the quality and responsiveness 
of every report submitted to the CmAT since its inception. A report’s score 
on quality and responsiveness is based on its transparency and on how well 
the report engages with the Committee’s concluding observations. To be 
  3. On the structure, function, and legitimacy of the human rights treaty bodies, see aNNe F. 
bayeFsky, The uN humaN righTs TreaTy sysTem: uNiversaliTy aT The crossroads (2001); FuTure 
oF uN TreaTy moNiToriNg, id; uN humaN righTs TreaTy bodies: law aNd legiTimacy (Helen 
Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012). For one of the few studies on the international human 
rights treaty periodic review process, see Lawrence J. LeBlanc, Ada Huibregtse & Timothy 
Meister, Compliance with the Reporting Requirements of Human Rights Conventions, 
iNT’l J. hum. rTs. 789 (2010). 
  4. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/39/51 (1985), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) [hereinafter CAT].
  5. LeBlanc et al., supra note 3.
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clear, this does not measure the accuracy of the information provided but 
rather the extent to which a government’s report explicitly recognizes and 
is responsive to shortcomings in implementation of and compliance with 
the treaty’s terms. In this respect, a report’s quality score reverses standard 
indexes of a country’s human rights practices. Thus, a higher quality repre-
sents more self-critical reports that admit to weaker implementation of and 
compliance with the prohibition against torture. A focus on report quality 
permits evaluation of the level of states’ engagement with the periodic review 
process, by analyzing reporting not simply as a procedural obligation but as 
an opportunity for government officials to learn about and become social-
ized into the international human rights regime.6 This research is important 
to eventually understand whether, and how, voluntary reporting contributes 
to appropriate human rights practices on the ground.
This article proceeds as follows: Section II provides a brief summary of the 
treaty monitoring body process and the claims made about this system’s (un)
importance. Section III examines why a government would bother to submit 
a report to a human rights treaty monitoring body. There is strong evidence 
of a mimetic process within the CAT reporting regime, with the probability 
of report submission increasing as more neighboring countries fulfill their 
reporting obligations. Measures of institutional capacity—particularly the 
existence of a national human rights institution—and measures of human 
rights commitment also largely explain which states report. Countries that 
have recently transitioned to democracy or experienced a recent improve-
ment in democratic governance, on the other hand, have a lower probability 
of reporting than more stable regimes. 
Section IV turns to the quality of reporting. It considers various factors 
that influence the ability and willingness of parties that do participate in 
the CAT reporting regime to render thorough, transparent, and responsive 
reports. While the degree to which a government is responsive to Com-
mittee concerns is positively correlated with a state’s institutional capacity 
and size, domestic political openness—democratic institutions and a recent 
transition to democracy—contribute to more thorough and transparent re-
ports. Furthermore, newly democratized countries are much more likely to 
submit a highly responsive report. These findings suggest that the reporting 
process may be very important for at least a subset of countries that want 
to tap into international expertise and signal domestic audiences of their 
commitment to best human rights practices. Section V concludes with direc-
tions for further research. 
  6. On the democracy- and deliberation-enhancing effects of reporting requirements, see 
Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, & Andrew Moravscik, Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism, 63 iNT’l org. 1, 18 (2009).
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II. THE RoLE of REPoRTING IN THE INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM
The legal regime for international human rights assumes that accountability 
is a potential pathway towards implementing treaty obligations and eventu-
ally improving rights practices. For this reason, every major human rights 
convention establishes an independent oversight committee to monitor 
treaty implementation.7 These committees are comprised of ten to twenty-
three independent experts nominated and elected by states’ parties for 
fixed, renewable terms of four years.8 By virtue of treaty ratification, states 
must submit to each committee periodic reports on the legislative, judicial, 
administrative, or other measures adopted to give effect to human rights 
obligations.9 In this sense, periodic reporting is an aspect of “procedural 
compliance” with a government’s treaty obligations.10 
Most committees employ the same basic framework for “consideration,” 
“study,” or “examination” of reports. Although not required, all committees 
consider reports in the presence of government representatives, employing 
the approach of a “constructive dialogue” during which the committee 
engages representatives, acknowledges progress made, and identifies areas 
for improvement.11 Following this exchange, all committees publish some 
form of “concluding observations,” though most commentators agree that 
these recommendations are not legally binding on states parties.12 All state 
reports and committee observations are made public.13
Notwithstanding the central role reporting plays in encouraging imple-
mentation and compliance with treaty obligations,14 the system is often 
criticized as unimportant, inadequate, and even “in crisis.”15 Late and non-
reporting is fairly widespread. For example, of the 147 states parties to the 
CAT in June 2011, thirty (20.4 percent) had still not submitted their initial 
report (with Somalia’s initial report the latest at twenty years) and 122 (83 
  7. This requirement is found in CAT, supra note 4, art. 17.
  8. The Committee Against Torture is the smallest of all treaty bodies, with ten members 
total. See id. art. 17(1).
  9. CAT requires states parties to submit an initial report within one year of ratification or 
accession, and subsequent periodic reports at least every four years. See id. art. 19(1).
 10. aNN keNT, chiNa, The uNiTed NaTioNs, aNd humaN righTs 236 (1999).
 11. U.N. International Human Rights Instruments, Report on the Working Methods of the 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies Relating to the State Party Reporting Process: Note by the 
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2005/4 (23 May 2011), at 7. 
 12. Michael O’Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies, 6 hum. rTs. l.rev. 27, 36 (2006).
 13. The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights now publishes all state reports 
on its website, available at http://tb.ohchr.org/. 
 14. Philip Alston, Effective Functioning of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations 
Human Rights Instruments: Final Report of the Independent Expert, U.N. Comm’n on 
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (27 Mar. 1997).
 15. bayeFsky, supra note 3 at i-ii; FuTure oF uN TreaTy moNiToriNg, supra note 2.
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percent) had between one and five periodic reports overdue.16 Submitted 
reports vary considerably in their structure, content, and quality.17 Com-
mittees have adopted guidelines on the form and content of reports,18 but 
many states do not always follow them. Moreover, it is debatable whether 
governments even take the report drafting process seriously.19 Compound-
ing these issues, as more states have ratified the major treaties, committees’ 
workloads have expanded without a corresponding increase in resources 
or meeting times.20
For some, the dismal reporting record merely reflects the primary weak-
ness of the human rights regime—an absence of incentives for states to police 
compliance.21 As states have little to no incentive to report, spotty report-
ing is unsurprising. More cynically, the system provides few inducements 
to report thoroughly: states may selectively provide requested information, 
present information in a way that obscures the situation on the ground, or 
ignore concerns or questions posed by the treaty body.22 For instance, gov-
ernments, such as the U.S., often fill their reports with long extracts from 
legislation and formal polices, rather than concrete practices.23 Exacerbating 
the voluntary nature of self-reporting, committee members have limited means 
to independently verify the information provided, a fact that government 
officials presumably realize.24 
 16. Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., at 288-98, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/44 (2011). The number of parties with overdue reports includes those instances 
where the Committee has indicated in its concluding observations on the prior report 
that a revised date of submission (usually in the near future) is permitted. This represents 
one way in which the Committee attempts to address both systematic late reporting and 
its own increased workload, deviating from the periodicity mandated in the Convention.
 17. Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body: 
Report by the Secretariat, U.N. International Human Rights Instruments, 5th mtg., at 10 
U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2 (22 Mar. 2006). 
 18. Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports to be Submitted by States 
Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, U.N. International Human Rights 
Instruments, at 10, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/2/Rev.6 (3 June 2009) [hereinafter Compilation 
of Guidelines]. This document is revised regularly.
 19. bayeFsky, supra note 3 at i-ii; Yoram Dinstein, Human Rights: Implementation Through 
the UN System, 89 proceediNgs am. soc. iNT’l l. 242 (1995).
 20. FuTure oF uN TreaTy moNiToriNg, supra note 2, at 6-7; Michael O’Flaherty & Claire O’Brien, 
Reform of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies: A Critique of the Concept Paper 
on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, 7 hum. rTs. 
l.rev. 141, 142 (2007).
 21. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 yale l.J. 1935, 
1938 (2002).
 22. Anne F. Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work: The Human Rights Agenda 
for the Twenty-First Century, in humaN righTs: aN ageNda For The NexT ceNTury 229, 239 
(John Lawrence Hargrove & Louis Henkin eds., 1994); Dinstein, supra note 19, at 244.
 23. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 
1 chi. J. iNT’l l. 347 (2000).
 24. Hathaway, supra note 21.
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Furthermore, critics assert that the individuals and groups most affected 
by treaty violations—and thus most likely to exert pressure on delinquent 
or non-compliant states—are rarely aware of the reporting process or the 
content of state reports. Other government or civil society actors are poorly 
informed because the process of reporting is conducted away from domestic 
media and nongovernmental organization (NGO) attention. Reports are not 
widely publicized or disseminated. Critics also point to inadequate qualifica-
tions of some committee members, resource and staff constraints, absence 
of specialization and expertise, and a limited amount of time to engage in 
a meaningful dialogue as serious impediments to the process.25
In contrast to such negative assessments, others assert that the reporting 
system generally works well.26 The committees themselves and the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have acknowledged 
shortcomings and made concerted efforts to reform procedures in order to 
improve both the quantity and quality of state reports.27 In order to indepen-
dently verify reports, committees increasingly rely on information provided 
by NGOs, national human rights institutions (NHRIs), or other third parties.28 
Some reports apparently do attract significant media and NGO attention,29 
although the level of attention varies considerably across states, reports, 
and time. According to these more positive assessments, the influence of 
the reporting process and committee recommendations is diffuse and indi-
rect—NGOs, national courts, opposition parties, or other governments can 
use reports and the committees’ concluding observations to pressure govern-
ments.30 In fact, the establishment of a reporting mechanism may be one of 
the primary reasons that rights groups lobby for the drafting or ratification 
of a treaty in the first place.31
 25. Bayefsky, Making Human Rights Treaties Work, supra note 22, at 233-234; FuTure oF 
uN TreaTy moNiToriNg, supra note 2, at 6-9; O’Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of 
United Nations, supra note 12, at 37; O’Flaherty & O’Brien, supra note 20, at 142-43.
 26. Felice D. Gaer, A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty 
Body System, 7 hum. rTs. l.rev. 7 (2007); FuTure oF uN TreaTy moNiToriNg, supra note 2, 
at 501-525.
 27. For the most recent effort to improve the treaty body system, see U.N.GAOR. Res. 
68/268, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/268 (9 Apr. 2014).
 28. Rules of Procedure, Rule 63, U.N. GAOR, Comm. Against Torture, 44th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/3/Rev.6 (13 Aug. 2013). See also U.N. Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Information for Civil Society Organizations and National Human 
Rights Institutions (NHRIs), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CAT/Pages/
NGOsNHRIs.aspx#section3.
 29. FuTure oF uN TreaTy moNiToriNg, supra note 2, at 505-56.
 30. See sally eNgle merry, humaN righTs aNd geNder violeNce: TraNslaTiNg iNTerNaTioNal law iNTo 
local JusTice (2006).
 31. For example, in advocating for a disabilities treaty the National Council on Disability 
argued it would provide “mechanisms for more effective monitoring, including reporting 
on the enforcement of the convention by governments and non-governmental organiza-
tions, supervision by a body of experts mandated by the convention, and possibly the 
consideration of individual or group complaints under a mechanism to be created by the 
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III. WHY PARTICIPATE IN CAT PERIodIC REvIEW?
Despite valid criticisms, the reporting record for the CAT is not negligible. 
Between the first reporting cycle in 1988 and January 2012, the CmAT 
received 313 of the 506 initial and periodic reports due.32 By agreement 
with the Committee, twenty-three of the reports due (for twenty-two separate 
countries) were eventually rolled into combined reports or provided partial 
information, leaving 170 reports not submitted as required. 
For those reports eventually received, very few were submitted on time. 
During the first round of reports due to the CmAT in June of 1988, Sweden 
was the first country to submit a report, and in fact, did so two days early.33 
Eleven out of fifteen countries with reports due in 1988 submitted them 
that same year. But only nineteen reports (6 percent of all reports submit-
ted) have been received on or before their deadlines, with an additional 
107 reports received within the year. Sixty-five reports—20.8 percent of all 
reports received—were submitted more than five years late. The Committee 
has adjusted to the reality that many states are not able, or willing, to keep 
up with their reporting much less to meet “deadlines.” Over time, by agree-
ment between the state and the Committee, reports have been consolidated, 
which may ultimately help to reduce delay and contribute to higher quality 
(but fewer) submissions. 
While the average delay in report submission has increased over time 
(see Figure 1), states are eventually (often after years of delay) submitting 
their initial reports and becoming better about submitting subsequent reports, 
albeit late. The CAT’s reporting record demonstrates clear differences across 
regions, with European countries having higher rates of reporting and meet-
ing deadlines. Countries in Africa (excluding North Africa) and South Asia 
have the poorest record for both submission and timeliness (see Figure 2).
Despite nonreporting and delay, scores of states have submitted hundreds 
of reports on the implementation of the torture prohibition. However, why 
   convention.” National Council on Disability, Understanding the Role of an International 
Convention on the Human Rights of Peoples with Disabilities: A White Paper (2002), 
available at http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2002/May232002. 
 32. This article’s analysis is based on original panel data (1977-2011) for every state party 
to the Convention against Torture. Every report submitted to the Committee against 
Torture was collected, along with descriptive information on submission and due dates, 
consideration by the Committee and concluding observations. Information on reporting 
deadlines and submission dates is taken from the reports themselves and the United 
Nations Treaty Database, specifically information on the reporting cycles, available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/countries.aspx. See also Anne 
Bayefsky’s website on The United Nations Human Rights Treaties, available at http://
www.bayefsky.com/; Section IV, infra, for further information on the coding scheme for 
report quality. 
 33. Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: 
Sweden, Comm. Against Torture, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/5/Add.1 (1988). 
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Figure 1—Delays in Reporting to the CAT Committee: 1988-2011
Source: Authors’ dataset, compiled from http://www.bayefsky.com/ and verified with 
information acquired from http://treatybodyreport.org/ and http://www.ohchr.org.
Figure 2—CAT Reporting Record, by Region
Source: Authors’ dataset, compiled from http://www.bayefsky.com/ and verified with 
information acquired from http://treatybodyreport.org/ and http://www.ohchr.org. 
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would any government exert the time, energy, and resources to monitor and 
to report on the implementation of and compliance with a human rights 
convention, if reporting is meaningless? Even if a government did go through 
the bureaucratic motions of submitting a report, why would it submit a 
thorough and responsive report as opposed to whitewashing noncompliant 
practices or unreflectively cutting-and-pasting laws and policies? A capacity 
to report might be a necessary condition. However, an underlying commit-
ment to human rights compliance, normative pressures from external actors, 
and domestic political pressures to “come clean” are also likely to increase 
the willingness of a state to comply with their reporting obligations in a 
comprehensive and timely manner. 
A. Capacity to Report
One reason for the variance in reporting may simply be state bureaucratic 
capacity. While some researchers do not believe that self-reporting on laws 
and policies requires overly prohibitive resources,34 others view capacity 
constraints as a major reason for temporary non-compliance with interna-
tional legal obligations generally.35 This observation may apply to proce-
dural compliance as well. The treaty committees, states, and the OHCHR 
all recognize that thorough reporting imposes a burden on states and that 
insufficient resources represent “significant barriers” to procedural compli-
ance.36 Financial, human, institutional, and legal resource constraints could 
all limit the capacity of a state to report. This article focuses on financial 
and institutional resources.
For many states, the costs of reporting regularly and thoroughly are 
not negligible relative to their available resources. While the cost of simply 
compiling legislation may not be overly prohibitive, monitoring and collect-
ing comprehensive data on torture practices is costly. Information collection 
systems and dedicated personnel must be put in place and startup requires 
resources. Providing up-to-date information every four years requires ongo-
ing data collection, verification, and analysis. On average, we would expect 
wealthier states to be able to report more often. Wealthier states should also 
be able to provide more information about shortcomings in compliance, 
which requires collection of comprehensive data on concrete practices. 
 34. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 118.
 35. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 iNT’l org. 175, 188 
(1993).
 36. Francoise J. Hampson, An Overview of the Reform of the UN Human Rights Machinery, 
7 hum. rTs. l. rev. 7, 12 (2007); Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Treaty Body Reform: 
The Case of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 7 
hum. rTs. l.rev. 201, 203 (2007).
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Because the collection of information on state practices demands more 
resources than the mere compilation of legislation, wealthier states possess 
a higher capacity to be forthcoming about compliance shortcomings within 
their reports.
Second, quality reporting requires an institutional capacity that can 
provide factual knowledge of, expertise in, and familiarity with the treaty 
regime and the reporting process. Some states develop this capacity through 
their NHRIs, independent governmental bodies specifically mandated to 
promote human rights. The intended role of NHRIs within the periodic 
review process is two-fold—both as a source of institutional capacity and, 
for independent NHRIs, a form of domestic pressure on the government to 
report. Under the 1991 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of 
National Institutions (the Paris Principles), NHRIs have a responsibility to 
“contribute to the reports which States are required to submit to United Na-
tions bodies and committees.”37 Additionally, most NHRIs are mandated to 
advise governments on the compatibility of proposed or existing legislation 
with international standards. NHRIs apply international standards in their 
monitoring activities and provide important sources of information regard-
ing states’ periodic reports.38 More recently, the OHCHR further encourages 
NHRIs to “contribute to the State parties reports, including through consulta-
tion and comments to the State official report,”39 to encourage governments 
to comply with their reporting obligations in a timely manner, to submit their 
own “shadow reports,” and otherwise provide information on implementa-
tion to the treaty bodies.40
An institutional capacity hypothesis leads us to expect a relatively 
more robust reporting record by states with NHRIs than by those without. 
In addition, countries that have decided to create an NHRI are likely more 
committed to the international human rights system, and thus the presence 
of an NHRI may also capture a state’s human rights preferences.
 37. National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Annex: Principles 
Relating to the Status of National Institutions, U.N. GAOR Res. 48/134, ¶ 3(d), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/48/134 (20 Dec. 1993).
 38. On the role of NHRI’s information provision and transparency-enhancing functions, see 
Cosette Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Transparency at Home: How Well do Govern-
ments Share Human Rights Information with Citizens?, in TraNspareNcy iN iNTerNaTioNal 
law (Andrea Bianchi & Anne Peters eds., 2013).
 39. U.N. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Information 
Note: National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) interaction with the UN Treaty Body 
System” (5 Apr. 2011), available at http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/Page%20
Documents/NHRIs%20and%20the%20Treaty%20Bodies.Infonote.11.4.2011.doc. 
 40. Richard Carver, A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human Rights Institutions 
and the Domestication of International Law, 10 hum. rTs. l. rev. 1 (2010).
Vol. 37590 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
b. Human Rights Commitment
Many countries do comply with most of their treaty obligations, and even 
more genuinely want to comply. Moreover, many want to be viewed as 
strong supporters of international human rights law. Faithful reporting is one 
way to signal commitment. Because it is not easy to monitor all instances 
of noncompliance, treaty ratification itself serves as a pooling equilibrium, 
in that it provides no indication of who is in fact complying. Reporting, 
however, potentially serves as a separating equilibrium, distinguishing re-
gime supporters and compliers from noncompliers, as it is relatively more 
costly (see above) than ratification alone. Monitoring represents one tool to 
detect violations.41 By self-reporting, governments can draw attention to their 
compliant policies and practices, thereby gaining additional reputational 
benefits for their efforts.42 Even “good faith” noncompliers—for example, 
those facing serious capacity constraints43—may view reporting as reaffirming 
their commitment to regime goals. On average then, we would expect states 
with a better human rights record to regularly comply with their reporting 
obligations. On the other hand, parties that have exerted little or no effort 
to implement or comply with a treaty would likely refrain from submitting 
reports, either because they seek to undermine regime progress or because 
they have no incentive to report.44
C. Imitation and Normative Pressure
Both normative pressure and imitation shape states’ decisions to ratify inter-
national human rights treaties,45 and it is plausible that these mechanisms 
continue to operate post-ratification with respect to procedural compliance. 
Governments facing uncertainty about what the international human rights 
system requires or expects in terms of reporting, may similarly imitate other 
states’ reporting practices. They may not know whether a report is “really 
required,” whether the due date is “hard and fast,” or even what constitutes 
 41. George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter Barsoom, Is the Good News about Com-
pliance Good News about Cooperation, 50 iNT’l org. 379 (1996); Jutta Joachim, Bob 
Reinalda & Bertjan Verbeek, International Organizations and Implementation: Pieces of 
the Puzzle, in iNTerNaTioNal orgaNizaTioNs aNd implemeNTaTioN, supra note 2, at 9-10.
 42. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 117.
 43. abram chayes & aNToNia haNdler chayes, The New sovereigNTy: compliaNce wiTh iNTerNaTioNal 
regulaTory agreemeNTs 161-162(1995).
 44. Schöpp-Schilling, supra note 36, at 204.
 45. See beTh a. simmoNs, mobiliziNg For humaN righTs: iNTerNaTioNal law iN domesTic poliTics 
(2009); Christine Min Wotipka & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Global Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty: State Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1965–2001, 23 
sociological Forum 724 (2008).
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an acceptable submission. Moreover, they may not know what the domestic 
or international repercussions of (not) reporting may be. As long as the over-
all record within the regime is fairly sparse, nonreporting may not generate 
social costs because it does not necessarily signal noncompliance with 
treaty obligations.46 However, as more states begin to get their reports in, 
the pressure to report should increase. This could be for mimetic reasons, if 
governments pay attention to and seek to imitate what a majority of other 
parties are doing. It could also be for normative reasons; the social pressures 
to report increase as reporting becomes viewed as a legitimate and expected 
practice of CAT members, with governments’ reporting decisions particularly 
influenced by the reporting record of states they especially respect or want 
to emulate for status reasons.47 
As the World Society literature emphasizes, governments might also view 
participation within the CAT as a way of demonstrating they are legitimate 
members of the regime regardless of whether they have fully implemented 
or complied with treaty obligations.48 This approach stresses the cumulative 
ability of international institutional commitments to pressure and to persuade 
recalcitrant governments. If this is accurate, then governments will report 
more frequently the more deeply they are embedded in the international 
human rights system. In addition, deeper enmeshment in the international 
human rights regime increases a country’s experience with expectations for 
self-reporting across human rights treaties, leading to improvements in report 
quality over time as governments learn “best practices.”
d. domestic Political Pressure
The reporting process is likely to be strongly shaped by domestic political 
needs and pressures. Reporting (and reporting well) sends a signal not only 
to the international community, but to domestic citizens and politicians as 
well. Domestic political pressure thus represents one reason why a govern-
ment might have incentives to report and report well. This pressure could 
come from domestic rights groups, who often lobby for both increased 
rights protection and greater transparency in treaty reports, or from political 
opposition groups or parties.49 To be sure, some governments are simply 
 46. Mitchell, supra note 2, at 118.
 47. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law, 54 duke l. J. 621 (2004).
 48. See generally Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from 
Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 iNT’l org. 325 (1996); John Meyer, John Boli, George 
Thomas & Francisco Ramirez, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 am. J. sociology 
148 (1997).
 49. On the role of domestic mobilization for human rights protections see simmoNs, supra 
note 45. See also Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, George W. Downs, Alastair Smith & 
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unconstrained by domestic groups when it comes to human rights account-
ability.50 In countries with no effective political opposition or where criticism 
of the government’s human rights practices will almost certainly be crushed, 
there is little domestic incentive for governments to report transparently on 
their treaty implementation. 
The situation is more complex in settings where domestic actors can 
increase the political costs associated with failure to report or with render-
ing a whitewashed report. In highly democratic polities with inherently 
high levels of transparency, providing a report to the CmAT could be seen 
as redundant and maybe unnecessary. Domestic groups who are confident 
that domestic political processes are exposing and correcting unacceptable 
torture practices may not see international oversight as especially important; 
indeed many such states may have robust legislative oversight on treaty 
implementation and even state reports.51 If this is the case, domestic political 
demands for external reporting could be muted. For these reasons, there may 
be no simple linear relationship between traditional measures of democracy 
and the willingness of a state to report. Where transparent democracies do 
report, it may have less to do with domestic politics than with providing an 
example to be emulated, as discussed above. 
Matters are even more complex in partial, unstable, or transitioning 
democracies. On the one hand, a self-critical report could provide damag-
ing information to political opponents of the regime.52 If taken seriously, it 
could spark demands for change that the government is not in fact ready 
   Feryal M. Cherif, Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human 
Rights, 49 iNT’l sTud. Q. 439 (2005) (arguing that party competition helps reduce human 
rights violations).
 50. James R. Hollyer & B. Peter Rosendorff, Do Human Rights Agreements Prolong the 
Tenure of Autocratic Ratifiers?, 44 N.y.u. J. iNT’l l. & pol. 791, 800 (2011-2012).
 51. Currently, the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) lists 165 parliamentary bodies in 
109 countries with a human rights focus, though only 63 parliamentary bodies in 49 
countries specialize in human rights. IPU, PARLINE database, available at http://www.
ipu.org/parline-e/instanceadvanced.asp. Not all of these committees have an explicit 
mandate to monitor treaty implementation, although some do. For example the United 
Kingdom established the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 2001, comprised of six 
members each from the House of Commons and the House of Lords. The Joint Com-
mittee has interpreted its mandate to include scrutiny of Bills for their human rights 
compatibility and compliance with human rights treaties, examination of reports made 
by the UK government under these conventions, and monitoring implementation of 
the concluding observations of the UN treaty bodies. uNiTed kiNgdom JoiNT commiTTee 
oN humaN righTs, The commiTTee’s FuTure workiNg pracTices: TweNTy-Third reporT oF sessioN 
2005-06 (2006), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/
jtrights/239/239.pdf. 
 52. On the relationship between democratic institutions, violent dissent, and the use of 
torture see Courtney Conrad & Will H. Moore, What Stops the Torture?, 54 am. J. pol. 
sci. 459 (2010). On the influence of treaty ratification within repressive regimes, see 
Emilie Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui , Justice Lost! The Failure of International Hu-
man Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most, 44 J. peace res. 407 (2007).
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to make, unleashing a type of normative “entrapment” associated with 
“spiraling” demands for change.53 If this is the case, transitioning or partial 
democracies will be less likely to take the political ‘risk’ of report submis-
sion. On the other hand, domestic groups could view reporting as a costly 
signal of the government’s intention to improve its rights practices. Such a 
report could assuage rather than heighten criticism, thereby giving the gov-
ernment breathing room to implement change at its own pace. If this is the 
case, then the existence of political opposition should correlate with more 
timely reports. It should also correlate with higher quality reports, which 
would send a more costly signal of the government’s intentions.
It is likely, however, that new governments will generally be willing to 
render reports on the practices of their predecessors. They may want to do 
so to make a clear break with the past, and to distance themselves from the 
repression of a previous regime. New regimes (particularly democratic ones) 
are often supported by domestic civil society groups that helped bring them 
to power, which provides these governments with an enhanced incentive 
and ability to collect information on the previous regime’s torture practices. 
A report to the CmAT is an excellent (indeed legally required) opportunity 
for a new government to set the record straight, to assign blame, and to 
chart a new course for the future. This suggests that reporting timeliness and 
especially quality should improve shortly after a significant regime change 
or democratic transition. 
E. findings
This section describes the variables employed to test these expectations for 
report submission and the results of a series of multivariate analyses. Table 
1 provides further summary statistics for each variable.
The first outcome is Report Submission, a dummy variable for whether a 
state party submitted a report (for year of submission and year due for those 
reports never submitted). For the hypothesis relating to government capacity 
discussed in Section III.A above, GDP per capita (as collected by the World 
Bank) measures a country’s financial capacity to report, while NHRI partly 
captures its institutional reporting capacity, measured by whether a country 
had established an NHRI at the time of report submission. Population is 
included to control for the size of a polity.54 
A country’s Torture Score proxies its human rights practices relevant to 
the Convention. Governments with worse torture records could be expected 
 53. Thomas risse, sTepheN c. ropp & kaThryN sikkiNk, The power oF humaN righTs: iNTerNaTioNal 
Norms aNd domesTic chaNge 172, 202 (1999).
 54. David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards & K. Chad Clay, The CIRI Human Rights Dataset 
(2013), available at http://www.humanrightsdata.com.
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to refrain from submitting reports to conceal this fact or to submit obscure 
reports when they do. This indicator is measured using the Cingranelli-
Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database’s torture score and coded as “0” for 
torture practiced frequently, “1” for torture practiced occasionally, and “2” for 
torture not practiced or unreported in a given year.55 Article 22 Declaration 
identifies states that have accepted the jurisdiction of the CmAT, under Article 
22 of the CAT, to receive individual complaints as an additional proxy for 
human rights commitment. Governments genuinely committed to the regime 
should be more likely to provide individuals a right to submit complaints to 
the Committee directly, and thus more likely to report.56
Reporting density within the CAT regime, measured by cumulative sub-
mitted reports as a percentage of total reports due, provides an indication 
of the degree of social pressure to report. There are two important referent 
groups: the states parties to the CAT and countries with which a government 
identifies, typically understood as neighboring countries.57 If states oper-
ate in conformity with an imitation logic, we would expect their reporting 
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Dependent Variables                   N       Mean       Standard Deviation       Min       Max
Report Submission 490 0.639 0.481 0 1
Quality 313 3.348 1.897 0 6
Responsiveness 197 1.609 1.171 0 3
     
Explanatory Variables                            Mean       Standard Deviation       Min       Max
GDP per capita (logged)  8.247 1.610 4.760 12.059
NHRI  0.647 0.478 0 1
Torture Score (CIRI)  0.758 0.745 0 2
Article 22 Declaration  0.408 0.492 0 1
Regime Reporting Density (%)  59.613 9.875 0 67.925
Regional Reporting Density (%)  55.573 23.658 0 100
Human Rights Treaties (Number)  11.218 3.723 2 21
Human Rights Treaties (Proportion)  0.488 0.163 0.090 0.910
Polity IV  4.484 6.229 -10 10
De facto Political Opposition  1.906 0.394 0 2
Newly Transitioned Democracy  0.287 0.453 0 1
Political Transition (1 year)  0.034 0.182 0 1
Political Transition (2 years)  0.060 0.238 0 1
Population (logged)  15.876 1.889 10.327 20.994
 55. Id. For a detailed discussion of the CIRI Human Rights Dataset and an evaluation of its 
scale, see Ann Marie Clark & Kathryn Sikkink, Information Effects and Human Rights 
Data: Is the Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Hu-
man Rights Measures?, 35 hum. rTs. Q. 539 (2013).
 56. The status of CAT, art. 22 Declarations can be found in the United Nations Treaty Col-
lection, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.
 57. Wotipka & Tsutsui, supra note 45.
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records to be correlated with the density of reporting in the regime more 
generally (Regime Reporting Density) as well as with the density of report-
ing in a state’s region (Regional Reporting Density). Human Rights Treaties 
(Number Ratified) measures the number of core international human rights 
treaties ratified by a state as a proxy for how embedded a country is within 
the international human rights system, and thus the extent of normative 
pressure to report it experiences. 
Five measures of domestic political pressure are employed within separate 
model specifications. First, although regime type (Polity IV score) represents 
a crude proxy for the presence of domestic political pressure, more demo-
cratic countries typically provide greater civil liberties and media freedom, 
facilitating the ability of domestic rights groups to pressure the government 
to comply with its reporting obligations.58 In addition, in strong democracies 
with institutionalized political opposition, governments may face greater 
pressure to report and submitted reports should be of higher quality because 
there are independent checks on information provided. In highly autocratic 
countries, on the other hand, a government would not need to report for 
domestic reasons.
Second, the variable De facto Political Opposition measures the existence 
of political parties within a country, coded “0” for no parties, “1” for one 
political party, and “2” for multiple parties.59 This variable provides insight 
into the extent to which a government might use the treaty monitoring process 
to placate or neutralize internal political opposition. Finally, as discussed 
previously, new democracies or regimes recently experiencing a political 
transition may have different incentives to report than established regimes. 
To capture this, the variable Newly Transitioned Democracy indicates those 
countries that have fallen both above and below 7 on the Polity IV scale since 
World War II or independence, but score above 7 the year a report is due 
or submitted (a standard threshold for democratic government). The Political 
Transition variable measures the extent to which a country has experienced 
a democratizing change in the past one to three years (an increase of +3 or 
more points on the Polity IV scale).60
Table 2 reports the results of a series of multivariate analyses. Across 
all three model specifications, there is strong evidence that regional-level 
 58. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr & Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/
polity/polity4.htm. 
 59. José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, & James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and 
Dictatorship Revisited, 143 pub. choice 75-76, 80 (2010). 
 60. Polity IV adopts a threshold value of a 3-point change in the POLITY variable to define 
a regime transition. See moNTy g. marshall, Ted roberT gurr & keiTh Jaggers, poliTy iv 
proJecT: poliTical regime characTerisTics aNd TraNsiTioNs, 1800-2012—daTaseT users’ maNual 
30 (2012).
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Table 2. Reporting to the Committee Against Torture
                                                       (1)               (2)               (3)
GDP per capita 
(logged) 0.054 0.00002 -0.042 
 (0.169) (0.173) (0.175)
 
NHRI  1.070** 1.269*** 1.111***
 (0.419) (0.441) (0.427)
 
Torture Score
(CIRI)  -0.316  -0.219 -0.258
 (0.320) (0.326) (0.319)
 
Article 22
Declaration 1.390*** 1.523*** 1.568***
 (0.533) (0.545) (0.542)
 
Human Rights Treaties (Number Ratified) -0.085 -0.104 -0.110
 (0.091) (0.093) (0.091)
 
Regional Reporting Density (%) 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.056***
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
 
Regime Reporting Density (%) -0.342 -0.381 -0.352
 (34.361) (28.343) (32.972)
 
Polity IV 0.032 -0.032 -0.005
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.039)
 
De facto Political Opposition 0.385 0.645 0.488
 (0.463) (0.485) (0.470)
 
Newly Transitioned -0.947**
Democracy (0.451)
 
Political Transition  -4.824***
(1 year)  (1.517)
   
Political Transition    -1.980**
(2 years)   (0.822)
Population 0.124 0.136 0.117
(logged) (0.128) (0.132) (0.130)
 
 
Observations 364 364 364
Note:       *p <0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Logistic regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is Report Submis-
sion. Year fixed effects included in all models. All variables lagged one year except Population 
and Newly Transitioned Democracy.
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imitation operates within the CAT regime. Reporting density within a state 
party’s region—though not within the regime as a whole—substantially 
increases a government’s probability of reporting. To be sure, within the 
past decade the CAT Committee and the OHCHR have made considerable 
efforts to improve the reporting record of the CAT regime. Still, it is entirely 
plausible that there is also a mimetic effect—as more neighboring states 
engage with the CAT regime, the expectation that governments should take 
their reporting obligations seriously increases. 
The existence of an NHRI also demonstrates a consistent and prominent 
influence on the probability of reporting. The presence of an NHRI may simply 
reflect a government’s commitment to protecting human rights. However, an 
NHRI could also contribute to report submission by providing institutional 
expertise and capacity, or by increasing the amount of domestic pressure on 
a government to report. While it is difficult to empirically disentangle these 
mechanisms, the strong association between the presence of an NHRI and 
report submission supports the OHCHR’s recent efforts to integrate NHRIs 
within the human rights treaty monitoring process. Financial capacity (GDP 
per capita), on the other hand, does not seem to increase the probability of 
report submission, suggesting that this is probably not a sufficiently precise 
indicator for “capacity” with respect to human rights reporting. 
With respect to preferences, the probability of submitting a report 
increases significantly for governments that have made Article 22 declara-
tions. Given that a serious commitment to the CAT regime often motivates 
governments to accept the jurisdiction of the Committee over individual com-
munications, it is not surprising that these governments are also more likely 
to submit state reports to the treaty body. In contrast, the torture practices 
of a country (Torture Score (CIRI)) do not seem to influence a government’s 
decision to report. States in which there have been no reported incidents of 
torture in a given year are not any more or less likely to submit their reports 
than states with widespread reported torture incidents.
Similarly, embeddedness within the international human rights system 
(Human Rights Treaties (Number Ratified)) does not influence the prob-
ability of report submission. This is somewhat surprising, as countries that 
agree to a large number of human rights treaties could be expected to fulfill 
obligations contained therein (including that of reporting). It is consistent, 
however, with “reporting fatigue” within the international human rights sys-
tem. When governments face multiple reporting obligations across human 
rights conventions, they may be less able and willing to keep up with their 
reporting obligations for each.61 
 61. Many governments must also provide information on implementation of the prohibition 
against torture in the context of reporting under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Given this partly overlapping procedural obligation, states may simply 
prioritize reporting to the Human Rights Committee over the specialized purview of the 
CmAT.
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Finally, the domestic political characteristics of a country, as measured by 
a government’s level of democracy (Polity IV) and the existence of political 
parties (De facto Political Opposition), do not seem to influence the likelihood 
of a government complying with its reporting obligations. Countries that have 
recently transitioned to democracy, on the other hand, have a much lower 
probability of submitting their reports compared to stable democracies or 
stable autocracies. The significant negative coefficient for Newly Transitioned 
Democracy suggests that new democratic governments may be less willing 
to immediately render reports on their country’s torture practices. Similarly, 
governments that have undergone a democratizing transition within the past 
two years (Political Transition) have a much lower probability of submit-
ting their CAT reports when due, as compared to countries that have not 
experienced a transition (stable regimes or countries that have moved in an 
anti-democratic direction). This tentatively suggests that right around the time 
of political transitions, governments are much more wary of the potential 
consequences of rendering reports on torture practices. It could also sug-
gest that such regimes simply do not place a high priority on fulfilling their 
CAT reporting obligations during and immediately following the transition 
period. However, when newly democratizing countries do report, the qual-
ity of their reports are exceptionally high, as discussed in the next section. 
Iv. CoNSTRUCTIvE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE CAT REGIME
While the very fact of reporting may provide an opening for constructive 
engagement with the treaty monitoring body, the review process can only be 
expected to be effective if governments take it seriously. Under what condi-
tions will states actually submit high quality reports? Here, “high quality” 
means the provision of information about: progress made in implementa-
tion of and compliance with treaty provisions; recognition of shortcomings 
or deficiencies in implementation and compliance; acceptance of and 
thorough responses to committee recommendations; and data meaningful 
to treaty provisions and compliance outcomes. The most transparent and 
highest quality reports are those that not only systematically acknowledge 
shortcomings, but also propose specific and concrete steps to remedy them, 
as opposed to attempting to justify such shortcomings. 
To capture report quality, we coded every submitted report along four 
dimensions: implementation, compliance, responsiveness, and data. Treaty 
bodies have requested that state reports include information on changes 
in law and administrative procedures (Implementation) and concrete prac-
tices on the ground relevant to treaty obligations (Compliance). Most have 
expressly requested statistical information on outcomes relevant to treaty 
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obligations (Data).62 “Constructive dialogue” implies responsiveness; therefore 
every subsequent periodic report was coded for how responsive a country 
was to the Committee’s concluding observations on their previous report 
(Responsiveness). Figure 3 provides an overview of the instrument used to 
code each report to the CmAT along these four dimensions.
 62. Alston, supra note 14, at 22.
REPoRT QUALITY
Implementation
	 ➣	 	0 = only positive information about laws, policies and programs relevant 
to treaty obligations
	 ➣	 	1 = mostly positive information about laws, policies and programs relevant 
to treaty obligations
	 ➣	 	2 = positive information, but explicitly and fairly systematically 
acknowledges shortcomings in implementation
Compliance
	 ➣	 	0 = no mention of compliance
	 ➣	 	1 = includes only positive information about compliance outcomes relevant 
to treaty obligations
	 ➣	 	2 = mostly positive information about compliance outcomes relevant to 
treaty, some discussion of shortcomings and future goals
	 ➣	 	3 = positive information, but explicitly acknowledges shortcomings in 
compliance outcomes relevant to treaty obligations
data
	 ➣	 	0 = report does not provide meaningful data/statistics (information about 
outcomes relevant to treaty obligations)
	 ➣	 	1 = report does provide meaningful data/statistics (information about 
outcomes relevant to treaty obligations)
REPoRT RESPoNSIvENESS
	 ➣	 	0 = does not acknowledge or respond to any concerns of the treaty body 
or only makes passing reference to committee concerns and provides 
vague response
	 ➣	 	1 = responds to questions posed by the treaty body (largely related to 
requests for information)
	 ➣	 	2 = acknowledges some concerns of the treaty body regarding compliance, 
but largely justifies current policies and efforts
	 ➣	 	3 = extensively acknowledges concerns of the treaty body and develops 
programs and approaches to meet concerns
Figure 3. Coding Scheme for CAT Report Quality and Responsiveness
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These measures of report quality do not reflect the extent to which a 
government actually implements and complies with CAT obligations. Rather, 
a report’s Implementation and Compliance scores measure the extent to 
which a government is transparent and forthcoming about ways in which it 
may fall short—however minimally, such as not providing sufficient food to 
prisoners or training to police officers—with respect to treaty obligations. It 
also reflects the extent to which a government, within its report, attempts 
to provide detailed proposals to address these shortcomings. Governments 
that largely fulfill CAT obligations may not have many implementation short-
comings in particular to reveal, though improvement is always possible. To 
account for this, report quality was measured based on a combination of 
both quantity and thoroughness of shortcoming acknowledgments. 
The reports that score low (0) on Implementation do not explicitly identify 
deficiencies in a government’s existing legislation, administrative regulations, 
or legal institutions relevant to the state’s CAT obligations. Many reports only 
briefly mentioned that existing laws do not include a definition of torture; 
these reports also received a score of (0) on the Implementation scale. In 
contrast, a report received an Implementation score of (1) if: it acknowledges 
the absence of a definition of torture and thoroughly discusses this deficiency, 
it acknowledges other areas under the CAT for which the government still 
lacks sufficient legislation (largely in the area of nonrefoulement obligations 
under CAT Article 3),63 or it recognizes that internal domestic or regional 
institutions (such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment)64 have criticized the 
government’s legislation for providing insufficient protections. Finally, reports 
that score high (2) on the Implementation scale are those that systematically 
acknowledge shortcomings in legislation. In addition, these reports discuss 
proposed or ongoing changes to address these deficiencies (i.e. legislative 
amendments proposed or a new bill drafted). For each report, these actions 
on addressing shortcomings must have occurred since the previous report’s 
submission, be ongoing, or represent proposed plans for future action.
The reports that score low (0) on the Compliance measure contain no 
discussion or information about treaty relevant outcomes or concrete prac-
tices on the ground (as compared to the focus on laws and regulations for 
Implementation). Reports that score a (1) on Compliance provide primarily 
positive or neutral information about concrete practices, such as prison condi-
tions, and may include references to individual cases of CAT violations. For 
a report to score a (2) on Compliance it must not only present information 
about shortcomings, but also explicitly acknowledge these outcomes as 
 63. CAT, supra note 4, art. 3.
 64. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, E.T.S. 126, entered into force 1 Feb. 1989, available at http://www1.
umn.edu/humanrts/euro/z34eurotort.html.
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problematic. These reports often point to specific difficulties or challenges 
faced by the country as reasons for non-compliance (i.e. lack of capacity or 
economic resources). Reports that score high (3) on Compliance provide a 
systematic discussion of shortcomings and, as with Implementation, outline 
proposed actions to address deficiencies. However, the focus here is on 
changing practices or outcomes (such as training more judges or police of-
ficers, or adjusting prisoners’ diets) rather than legislation. Actions to address 
shortcomings must have occurred since the previous report’s submission, be 
ongoing, or represent proposed plans for future action.
A report’s score on Responsiveness measures the extent to which a 
government acknowledges the CmAT’s recommendations to address identi-
fied shortcomings (again, however minimal) and responds with a relatively 
detailed proposal to do so. In this respect, a report’s Responsiveness score 
proxies the extent to which a government engages in a dialogue with the 
treaty body. For this reason, a state party’s first report does not receive a 
Responsiveness score; only subsequent reports can potentially respond to the 
Committee’s concluding observations on previous reports. Reports that score 
low (0) on Responsiveness do not acknowledge any treaty body concerns or 
only make passing reference to the Committee’s concluding observations. 
Reports that answer questions raised by the Committee—either through 
their concluding observations or through requests for additional information 
conveyed to the party prior to report submission—receive a score of (1) if 
the response provides information without mentioning actions to address 
the issue raised. Reports that address some of the Committee’s concerns 
but explain why the status quo satisfies these recommendations or rejects 
the concern on other grounds receive a score of (2). These reports largely 
justify current policies and efforts in relation to a substantial proportion of 
the recommendations addressed. Reports that score high (3) on Responsive-
ness may still include some justifications for the status quo, but also outline 
concrete efforts or actions taken or proposed to address the majority of the 
Committee’s concerns and recommendations.
Finally, each report received a dichotomous Data score based on whether 
it included meaningful data and statistics, defined as information relevant to 
treaty obligations. Reports that only include data on country demographics 
or socioeconomic variables received a score of (0), while those that include 
at the very least one set of relevant statistics received a score of (1). In sum, 
each initial report can potentially receive an aggregate Quality score ranging 
from 0 (low quality) to 6 (high quality), while subsequent reports can poten-
tially receive an aggregate Quality and Responsiveness score ranging from 
0 (low quality and responsiveness) to 9 (high quality and responsiveness).
The quality and responsiveness of reports improves both over time 
and with the report number (see Figures 4 and 5), indicating that as states 
report more, their reports improve on average. This could be indicative of 
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Figure 5—Aggregate Report Quality, by Report Number
Source: Authors’ dataset, based on coding all submitted state reports along dimensions 
of Implementation, Compliance, Responsiveness and Data. Aggregate quality score for 
initial reports (Report Number 1) ranges from 0 (not transparent or forthcoming) to 6 
(highly transparent and forthcoming). Aggregate quality score for subsequent reports 
(Report Numbers 2-7) ranges from 0 (not transparent, forthcoming or responsive) to 
9 (highly transparent, forthcoming and responsive).
Figure 4—Aggregate Report Quality, by Year
Source: Authors’ dataset, based on coding all submitted state reports along dimensions 
of Implementation, Compliance, Responsiveness and Data. Aggregate quality score 
ranges from 0 (not transparent, forthcoming or responsive) to 9 (highly transparent, 
forthcoming and responsive).
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increased engagement or learning about what the international bureaucracy 
wants to hear. But it could also be the result of selection—only the most 
sincere countries submit multiple reports and the higher quality scores actu-
ally represent fewer total reports. In addition, the CmAT has increased their 
specific recommendations in their concluding observations in recent years, 
as opposed to vague expressions of concern characteristic of early responses. 
This change in format could also account for the secular improvement in 
report quality and responsiveness over time. 
Figure 6—Initial Reports: Aggregate Average Report Quality, By Year
Source: Authors’ dataset, based on coding all submitted state reports along dimen-
sions of Implementation, Compliance, Responsiveness and Data. Aggregate quality 
score for initial reports ranges from 0 (not transparent or forthcoming) to 6 (highly 
transparent and forthcoming).
Are states learning how to submit higher quality reports simply from 
their own experience, or are they learning from observing other countries’ 
reports and interactions with the CmAT? With respect to initial reports, 
mimetic learning is apparently occurring, as the average quality of first 
reports submitted within the past decade is considerably higher than that 
of initial reports submitted in the early years of the CAT regime (see Figure 
6). This could be due to the fact that in 2004 the OHCHR and the treaty 
bodies adopted a set of “Harmonized Guidelines on Reporting under the 
International Human Rights Treaties,” with the aim of clarifying the appro-
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priate form and content of state party reports.65 While the average quality 
of initial and subsequent reports has slightly increased since the adoption 
of these Harmonized Guidelines, these guidelines alone cannot account 
for the noticeable improvement in report quality between 1994 and 2004. 
In theory, wealthier countries possess the financial resources to be able to 
report more thoroughly, as comprehensive information and data on concrete 
practices is relatively more costly to collect than information on legislation 
alone. However, there does not appear to be significant descriptive varia-
tion across income levels in either the overall Quality of a report (combined 
scores on Implementation, Compliance and Data) or in Responsiveness. With 
respect to institutional capacity, countries that have established NHRIs by 
the time of submission do seem to provide higher quality reports on aver-
age, for both initial and subsequent reports, than countries without NHRIs. 
The presence of an NHRI is associated with an increase in aggregate report 
Quality of 1.066 (independent t-test, p < .001) and in Responsiveness of 
0.474 (independent t-test, p < .001), suggesting that institutional capacity 
plays an important role in quality and responsive reporting. 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of a series of multivariate analyses 
separately examining the factors correlated with report Quality and Respon-
siveness. Neither financial capacity (GDP per capita) nor the existence of 
an NHRI appears to increase a state’s probability of submitting a higher 
quality report, controlling for other factors. However, the presence of an 
NHRI does significantly increase the probability of a government being more 
responsive to Committee concerns or recommendations, suggesting that 
either institutional capacity or this additional domestic pressure improves a 
government’s dialogue with the CmAT.
Governments with treaty-compliant practices and policies were hypoth-
esized to be more likely to submit a thorough report than countries that 
engage in torture, in order to draw attention to their implementation and 
compliance with the treaty. Surprisingly, there is no significant relationship 
between a country’s Torture Score (CIRI) and the quality of reports submitted. 
While a country’s torture score weakly correlates with its responsiveness to 
Committee recommendations, this relationship is in the opposite direction 
than expected and loses significance when controlling for whether the coun-
try has recently democratized. Still, the finding that countries with abysmal 
records for torture are responding to the CmAT deserves follow up research.
Not surprisingly, countries that have made Article 22 Declarations are 
more likely to submit higher quality and responsive reports. Compared to 
governments that have not accepted the Committee’s jurisdiction, Article 22 
states on average submit higher quality reports (+1.327 Quality, indepen-
 65. Compilation of Guidelines, supra note 18.
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Table 3. CAT Report Quality
 
                   (1)                      (2)
GDP per capita  0.304 0.405
(logged) (0.391) (0.407)
 
NHRI  -0.063 0.020
 (0.319) (0.318)
Torture Score 0.030 0.093
(CIRI)  (0.229) (0.230)
 
Article 22 0.002 -0.059
Declaration (0.347) (0.355)
 
Human Rights Treaties (Proportion Ratified) -0.094 -0.088
 (1.702) (1.798)
Polity IV 0.136*** 0.062
 (0.041) (0.054)
Newly Transitioned  1.100**
Democracy  (0.515)
Population
(logged) 0.955 0.950
 (1.164) (1.178)
Observations 283 283
Note: *p <0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Ordered probit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is Re-
port Quality (all reports). Year and country fixed effects included in all models. All variables 
lagged one year except Population and Newly Transitioned Democracy.
dent t-test, p < .001) and more responsive ones (+0.826 Responsiveness, 
independent t-test, p < .001). However, when controlling for other factors, 
the significant relationship between Article 22 Declarations and report 
Quality and Responsiveness disappears. Article 22 Declarations represent a 
stronger commitment to the CAT rules, but some governments might also be 
concerned that admissions made within their reports could be used against 
them by individual complainants in future proceedings.
At first glance, governments more deeply embedded in the international 
human rights system (Human Rights Treaties (Proportion Ratified)) appear to 
submit higher quality reports on average. This finding seems at odds with 
the argument that many states are insincere ratifiers, as we would not nec-
essarily expect these states to be willing to provide more information about 
deficiencies in implementation of and compliance with the treaty. However, 
when controlling for other factors, the importance of human rights linkages 
for both report Quality and Responsiveness loses statistical significance.
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Table 4. CAT Report Responsiveness
 
                                                                                  (1)                   (2)
GDP per capita  0.163 0.144
(logged) (0.773) (0.783)
 
NHRI  1.869*** 2.268***
 (0.600) (0.671)
Torture Score -0.885**  -0.379
(CIRI)  (0.405) (0.465)
 
Article 22 0.190 0.213
Declaration (0.347) (0.966)
 
Human Rights Treaties (Proportion Ratified) 5.980* 3.115
 (3.393) (3.535)
Polity IV 0.135 -0.417*
 (0.154) (0.225)
Newly Transitioned  5.059***
Democracy  (1.386)
Population 17.521*** 17.286***
(logged) (6.129) (5.991)
 
Observations 180 180
Note: *p <0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
Ordered probit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is Re-
port Responsiveness (subsequent reports). Year and country fixed effects included in all mod-
els. All variables lagged one year except Population and Newly Transitioned Democracy.
With respect to domestic political characteristics, more democratic states 
(Polity IV) submit more thorough reports on average.66 In line with the gen-
eral trend within democracies for improved transparency about government 
decisions and activities,67 democracies more readily recognize shortcomings 
in implementation of or compliance with their CAT obligations and adhere 
to a principle of transparency within their reports. This finding is stronger for 
Newly Transitioned Democracies. Although new democracies are less likely 
 66. The measure for De facto political opposition is not included within analyses of report 
Quality and Responsiveness because the distribution of this variable for governments 
that have submitted reports is highly skewed to the right. James R. Hollyer, B. Peter 
Rosendorff, & James Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and Transparency, 73 J. pol. 1191, 
1202 (2011).
 67. John M. Ackerman & Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion of Freedom 
of Information Laws, 58 admiN. l. rev. 85 (2006); The righT To kNow: TraNspareNcy For 
aN opeN world (Ann Florini ed., 2007); James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, & James 
Raymond Vreeland, Democracy and Transparency, 73 J. pol. 1191 (2011).
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to report, those that do are much more likely to be thorough, transparent, and 
responsive to CmAT concerns and recommendations. This is an important 
finding, consistent with others about treaty effects in the literature. Simmons, 
for example, finds that partially democratic and transitioning countries are 
more likely to reduce torture after ratifying the CAT.68 Both of these patterns 
are consistent with the claim that treaty ratification and reporting stimulate 
domestic mobilization that leads to both better reporting and more serious 
efforts to comply. The quality of reporting for newly transitioned democra-
cies suggests serious engagement by this subset of states in the international 
human rights regime. 
v. CoNCLUSIoN
This article has explored one of the most important institutions for dialogue 
between sovereign states and the international community: the process of 
reporting to treaty bodies on implementation of, and compliance with, in-
ternational human rights agreements. It focused on one of the most difficult 
cases for monitoring via self-reporting—the Convention against Torture. Why 
are some governments much more willing than others to report their prac-
tices thoroughly and frankly, and to constructively engage with the CmAT’s 
recommendations and concerns?
Two key findings include the role of NHRIs and the influence of the 
reporting patterns of others. Simply being a “wealthy” state is not associated 
with punctual reporting. However, having the institutional capacity or addi-
tional source of domestic pressure from a National Human Rights Institution 
certainly is associated with on time reporting. In fact, the presence of an 
NHRI was a better predictor of reporting than (admittedly crude) measures of 
torture. Moreover, the willingness to report appears highly conditional, with 
reporting by other states in a region positively influencing the likelihood of 
reporting in a given state. Unfortunately, the opposite is true as well: when 
neighboring states fail to report, this is taken as a signal that procedural non-
compliance is “okay.” Reporting is subject to social entropy: opting out only 
encourages others to do the same, and degrades expectations of procedural 
compliance with the regime. These findings suggest the potential value of a 
regional strategy to improve reporting habits and competencies. Working with 
clusters of geographic neighbors to improve reporting habits may be much 
more successful than focusing on the most (or the least) responsive states.
This study breaks new ground by systematically coding and explaining not 
only the record but also the quality of state reporting within the CAT. Quality 
is important if we understand the reporting exercise to be a serious conversa-
 68. simmoNs, supra note 45.
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tion about norms and best practices. Quality reports were associated not only 
with capacity (again, NHRIs were important to higher quality reporting), but 
also with conditions that suggest the importance of domestic politics in the 
reporting process. Unsurprisingly, democratic countries are much more forth-
coming about their progress on implementation of and compliance with the 
CAT and more willing to recognize areas for improvement than nondemocratic 
ones. More interesting, this research reveals that although new democracies 
are less likely to submit reports. However, when they do, these reports tend 
to be: more transparent about implementation shortcomings, more thorough 
in proposing measures to address deficiencies, and more responsive to Com-
mittee concerns. This finding is consistent with a growing body of research 
that views the explicit embrace of international human rights norms as an 
integral aspect of the domestic process of mobilization, dialogue, and com-
mitment making.69 There are good reasons to believe that newly democratic 
regimes enhance their credibility (and satisfy mobilized domestic audiences) 
by engaging as thoroughly and frankly as possible with “official representa-
tives” of the international human rights community. 
Future research should concentrate on the value of the human rights 
reporting system for improving rights on the ground. There are several 
reasons to expect that a robust reporting regime may contribute to better 
human rights in states that take the process seriously. Self-reporting provides 
information for domestic audiences who have a stake in their government’s 
implementation of international agreements, and may even set in motion 
bureaucratic routines to gather, authenticate and analyze information that 
might not have occurred in the absence of the obligation to report. To this 
extent, it is possible that reporting helps develop an autonomous capacity 
to self-monitor. As this article has emphasized, reporting is not simply a 
procedural obligation, but also an opportunity for government officials to 
learn about and become socialized into the human rights regime.
Furthermore, self-reporting represents an opportunity for citizens and 
domestic civil society to organize, to mobilize, to participate in, and to shape 
their government’s human rights laws, institutions, and practices. Very little 
is currently known about how state reports or the Committee’s concluding 
observations play out within domestic politics or whether domestic groups 
largely ignore these documents. Is the report discussed within the local 
press? Do nongovernmental organizations use the reports to legitimate 
their demands or to contradict the claims of the regime? Are the reports or 
concluding observations discussed in parliamentary debates or mentioned 
by opposition leaders? Future research should explore whether and how 
the degree and quality of governments’ and citizens’ participation in this 
dialogue affects rights practices on the ground.
 69. Id. (on the role of domestic mobilization for human rights protections).
